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BACKGROUND 1

Great attention has been placed, over the years, on the
choice and design of economic instruments for a more
efficient allocation of environmental goods and services
and on stimulating environmental investment in such a
way as to reduce the society-wide costs of attaining a
desired level of environmental quality. Such policies,
falling under the rubric of “getting the prices right,”
presuppose that once set, the prices will be paid.
However, in the transition economies of Eastern Europe,
not even existing low prices for environmental goods and
services are paid, let alone the presumably higher prices
entailed by economic instruments set at allocatively
efficient levels. Instead, compliance, such as it is, occurs
through explicit and tacit negotiation and persuasion.
Moreover, the region is undergoing massive privatization,
the most powerful economic instrument of them all,
whose effect in the name of profit is to reduce waste but
also to take advantage of regulatory weakness. Taking as
an example the water sector in Romania, the present
article develops a simple theoretical model of enterprise
compliance in the context of non-payment of
environmental goods and services and an endogenous
level of enforcement on the part of the water authority.
The model is then econometrically applied at the level of
the enterprise and the river basin to analyze the roles of
enforcement and economic instruments in stimulating
environmental investment in the presence of
privatization. The water sector is particularly good to
study given that it takes on aspects of both a “good” as
well as a “service.” The article ends with policy
recommendations and the prediction that privatization on
net will improve environmental quality even in the shortrun.

Romania is a country of 23 million people. Water
resources include the Danube River and twelve tributary
basins, as well as the 650,000-hectare Danube Delta —
the largest wetland in Europe — and part of the Black
Sea. In addition to having the largest old growth forest
reserves in Europe and abundant deposits of ferrous and
non-ferrous metals, the country has reserves of oil,
natural gas, and coal. This resource abundance, however,
has had its costs. 2 The country developed minerals,
petrochemical, and metals processing industries that are
highly polluting, leading to economic, health, and
ecological impacts on an enormous scale. Such impacts
have also stymied the development of activities with a
potential future, such as tourism and fisheries. 3 While
these costs are clear, weak economic growth during the
transition has led to understandable trepidation about
pursuing too quick or rigorous a program of
environmental protection, and economic instruments in
particular.
Romania, like many other Eastern European countries,
launched an ambitious privatization program in 1997 in
an effort to generate strong economic growth. These and
other reforms will place new stresses on the
environmental regulatory authorities at a time when
budgetary austerity imposed by the IMF-FESAL
agreement will lead to a substantial reduction in
personnel and equipment. While options are being
considered on how to put regulatory finance onto a
sustainable basis and though a comprehensive new set of
environmental regulations has been drafted (Zinnes
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[1996]), enforcement in the near term is certain to get
worse.
It is important to consider whether the
privatization program will generate enterprise investment
in environmental protection or instead lead to further
environmental degradation as has been found elsewhere
(Reed [1995]).

For enforcement, the Water Department of MAPPM and
AR can take legal action against non-complying facilities
and levy fines and other sanctions — including closure
— against violators. Compliance is monitored in many
ways. First, AR conducts routine plant sampling and
inspections, including the review of the facility’s records
(enterprises are responsible for monitoring and reporting
their discharges). While the number of inspections is
planned, the timing of the visit is not known to the
enterprise. Second, AR carries out unplanned plant
visits, usually based on concerns raised from other
inspections. Third, when an accident is reported, AR
does an immediate inspection. Finally, through its
ambient program, AR also conducts periodic sampling
from a series of sampling checkpoints along water bodies,
both selectively for pollution-prone water bodies and
according to predefined annual programs.
Local
environmental protection agencies also carry out some
limited water monitoring.

At the same time, stimulated by (1) the new government’s
campaign commitment to set up an environmental fund,
(2) anticipation of World Bank loan conditionalities, and
(3) pressure to signal to the European Union Romania's
sincerity to meet the environmental commitments of the
legal approximation process of accession, there is a
renewed interest in developing economic instruments. It
is thus particularly germane to analyze in the context of
Romania what the role should be of economic
instruments and of command and control to elicit the
necessary level of enterprise environmental investment in
the future. In order to address these questions, we
examine the effects that such polices have played so far in
the privatization process on the water sector.

Water charges exist in Romania and are collected by AR.
They consist of prices for raw water abstraction and
tariffs for discharges into water bodies.4
Since
abstractions can either be consumed or be discharged
after use for cooling or for effluent removal, the charge
system covers water as a “good” and as a “service.” They
were introduced at the start of 1991 and rates are indexed
quarterly.

The water sector is regulated by the Water Department
located in the Ministry of Water, Forests, and
Environmental Protection (MAPPM).
The Water
Department supervises Apele Române (AR), a public
utility with branches in each of the country's 12 river
basins. AR is responsible for the management of 70,000
kilometers of rivers and 150 multi-purpose lakes and
dikes. AR supplies 95 percent of the raw water to
municipalities, industry, and agriculture.
Local
government is responsible for municipal water supply and
wastewater treatment.

Considering raw water prices first, these are set
nationally based on type of water body (surface,
subterranean, Danube) and category of user, with industry
paying more than agriculture, and agriculture paying
more than households. With little relationship to
location-specific or temporal characteristics, however,
this system does not accurately signal differences in water
scarcity to economic agents. As a result, water-intensive
activities may be undertaken in (socially) high-cost zones,
though in principle AR may reject a construction permit
request for such an activity. For the most part, however,
plant location decisions under communism were not
based on economic considerations. Water prices are also
very low: rates per thousand cubic meters in 1996 for
industrial users were 23,755 lei (U.S.$4) from rivers,
2,851 lei (U.S.$0.47) from the Danube, and 29,240
(U.S.$5) from underground sources. Penalties of two to
six times normal rates can be levied for abstractions
above permitted limits, with the multiplier depending on
the amount of the infraction and whether it occurred
during a period of restricted consumption.

Water resources in Romania are administered according
to the principles of integrated water management which
link water quality and water quantity. This linkage is
important because excessive abstractions lower
underground and surface water levels, thereby increasing
contaminant concentrations and creating the same
deleterious environmental effects as effluent discharges.
The permitting process, the heart of the regulatory
system, incorporates this duality by issuing permits and
assessing charges and fines both for water consumption
and for effluent discharges. The 12 river basin branch
offices of Apele Române issue permits based on the
national water management strategy specifying the
amount of water used or consumed, as well as the
quantity and quality of effluents. Water management
standards include effluent standards that limit the amount
or rate of discharges. Ambient water quality standards
also exist. These standards provide some flexibility,
because they allow facilities to choose which technologies
should be used to meet requirements.

There are also charges for effluent discharges into water
bodies. This charge system comprises two components,
a tariff for within-permitted discharge concentrations and
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a penalty (over and above the tariff) for above-permitted
discharge concentrations. In 1996, for example, tariffs
were levied only on two contaminants: a 7,850 lei/ton
charged for suspended solids and a 31,750 lei/ton
(U.S.$5.30) charge for BODs.

emissions, and to enterprises' indifference to operating
with a valid permit. Therefore, two complementary
approaches have been taken, investment co-financing and
compliance schedules.
The favored instrument of the government has been to
augment the permit system with environmental
abatement investment co-financing to stimulate
enterprises to fulfill permit requirements. In 1994, for
example, the national treasury provided the majority of
environmental financing. In the country's 1996 National
Environmental Action Plan, the budget's share of
investment fell to 45 percent of all investments compared
to 58 percent in 1994 (see MAPPM 1995). Under the
1997 FESAL agreement with the IMF, this mechanism is
not likely to continue, with the burden being shifted onto
economic agents themselves as the enterprises are
privatized.

The penalty depends on both the volume of wastewater
emitted and the difference between actual and permitted
concentrations. For the ith pollutant, the formula used is
Pi = (Ci - Ci*) V Ri where Pi is the total penalty assessed
on the ith pollutant, Ci and Ci* are respectively the actual
and permitted concentrations of ith pollutant, V is the
annual volume of waste-water discharged, and Ri is the
rate for discharging the ith pollutant. In theory, for
repeat offenders penalties are doubled each year until
concentration standards are met.
Penalties are levied on twenty substances divided into two
general categories. The first group (containing, e.g.,
nitrates, BODs, chlorine, cadmium,) is for those for
which allowable levels are established to meet
concentration standards. The second group (containing,
e.g., mercury, persistent pesticides, radioactive residues,
and carcinogens) is made up of substances for which no
discharges are permitted and Ci* is zero. Rates are lower
for the first group of pollutants (BODs at $U.S.4.90 per
metric tonne in 1995) than for the second group (mercury
at U.S.$13,000 per metric tonne in 1995).

While the concept of compliance schedules was
developed to create feasible plans for polluters to reach
compliance, in practice they have been used in the water
sector to work with the enterprises to simply improve
their performance. As such, it is an open question for
analysis as to whether their use has actually slowed down
full compliance.
With the hope of increasing its collections of water
charges, MAPPM implemented a phase-in program for
payments of assessed penalties. It was announced that for
1991, 25 percent of the assessed penalty must be paid, 50
percent of what was assessed in 1992 should be paid, 75
percent in 1993, and 100 percent from 1994 onwards.
Starting in 1996, fines owed must double each year until
individual standards are met. Unfortunately, the schedule
was not indexed for changes in prices and inflation
averaged 175 percent per year during the period 1991 to
1996. Debts from early in the phase-in period were
therefore highly discounted. In real terms the pressure on
enterprises actually fell over time up until 1995 and only
after the period of forgiveness ended did real penalty rates
increase.

THE STYLIZED FACTS
In spite of their low levels, revenue collection from water
prices and discharge tariffs is a serious problem.
Penalties assessed for effluent discharges and raw water
abstractions above permitted limits in 1996 were 2.96
billion lei (U.S.$1.5 million), yielding collections of 482
million lei. Worse, while revenues assessed in real terms
in 1996 were 240 percent of those assessed in 1993, the
collection rate had fallen from 24 percent in 1993 to 16
percent in 1996. Regarding water prices, while in 1996
AR regulated 5,000 industrial permit holders, it also was
owed arrears from 3,000 of them.5 However, only three
enterprises were closed between 1991 and 1997 due to
water infractions. 6

These broad impressions can be deepened by looking at
two datasets. The first is a firm-level survey for 1996
administered as part of the present research effort. It
comprises a random sample of 81 above-average7
industrial water users possessing or in the process of
receiving a water permit from AR.8 The second contains
data for the years 1993–1996 on the fees and fines
assessed and collected from all of AR’s 5000 clients
aggregated at the river basin level. Bivariate correlations
from these two data tell a consistent, if surprising story
leading to a set of stylized facts. 9

This relatively lax enforcement is perhaps not surprising.
At least until recently, past governments regardless of the
ministry have had an implicit soft approach on
enterprises, many of which were prohibited from
borrowing and subject to other uneconomic restrictions.
This has led to the authorities’ inability to impose
penalties or set prices for environmental goods and
services at economic levels to achieve acceptable
14

Physically, water pollution and abstraction were unrelated
to whether the enterprise was located in a big or small
town (though smaller-town enterprises used older
technologies). The greater the share of state ownership
in an enterprise, the more likely it had a water
purification station. While bigger enterprises abstracted
and discharged more, concentrations of discharges were
unrelated to enterprise size.

collections. First, there is a basic simultaneity between
compliance and enforcement which needs to be
disentangled to properly understand agency incentives.
Second, the only way to understand the regulator’s
inspection program is to see that only unplanned
inspections and “accidental” inspections directly reflect
non-compliance at the enterprise, while routine
inspections, established by bureaucratic inertia based on
the number in the previous year (and thus only weakly
related to current year compliance), represent the
enforcement stance of AR toward the enterprise.
Regarding the investment and finance picture, the level
of investment in water abatement was unrelated to the
size of enterprise profits, equity, or turnover. State
budget subsidies for water abatement investment were
negatively related to enterprise profits, to whether it
exported and had regular foreign contacts, and to whether
the enterprise engaged in water pre-treatment. Higher
capacity utilization was related to higher concentrations
in discharges and, therefore not surprisingly, related to
higher levels of water investment, particularly investment
for improving water quality. Curiously, higher capacity
utilization was also associated with higher levels of
investment subsidies and less interaction with the foreign
sector.

The penalty picture for abstraction was unexpected: no
penalties were issued for excess abstraction for any
enterprise in the sample. There simply was no abovepermitted abstraction; in spite of the regulators’ claims,
the abundance of raw water was such that water
allocations were not binding constraints for enterprises.
This view is reinforced below when enterprise investment
patterns are discussed.
Regarding penalty collection rates, the greater the
number (as well as average and total value) of penalties
assessed, the lower was the enterprise’s penalty payment
rate.10 Examining their ability to pay, enterprises with
higher (gross) profits had fewer penalties (in number) but
a higher total value of penalties assessed. The number
and average size of penalties were unrelated, however, to
the profit rate. Looking at the relationship between
penalties to inspections, the number of penalties was
positively related to the number of unannounced
inspections but not related to routine or accidental
inspections. Total penalties assessed were related
positively to both routine and unannounced inspections,
but not to accidental inspections. Penalties paid,
however, were positively correlated to accidental
inspections while not related to routine and unannounced
inspections. Thus, while most penalties were issued as a
result of unannounced inspections, payment of these were
generally ignored. Only inspections as a result of
accidents resulted in a fine actually being paid. In fact,
the greater the number of unannounced inspections, the
lower was the enterprise’s penalty payment rate. 11
Regarding regulatory control strategies, the probability of
being inspected was not related to the enterprise’s
location (perhaps not surprising since, as mentioned
earlier, neither was pollution or abstraction). The
number of total inspections had no relation to the
economic size (e.g., number of employees, revenues,
equity) of the enterprise or its amount of abstraction.
Finally, the greater the degree of state ownership (versus
domestic private, or foreign), the greater the probability
of routine and unannounced inspection and the higher the
value of total and average penalties; the opposite was true
the more ownership was domestic private.

Regarding public participation, a quarter of the
enterprises in the sample experienced some public
pressure. Most was related to pollution, not to excess
abstraction — perhaps not surprising given that in truth
raw water was not scarce.12 The greater the share of
domestic private ownership, the more likely a chance of
pressure being exerted on an enterprise (the opposite is
true with state-owned enterprises).
This is odd
considering that the sample indicated that the higher the
state ownership share, the higher were the pollution
penalties.
Those firms with compliance schedules in force were
much more likely to invest in abatement (though only
financed through their own funds) but such investment
was related to water quality only (the compliance
schedule being uncorrelated to water quantity
investment). While the existence of a compliance
schedule was independent of the penalty collection rate
for a firm (the latter, perhaps, being a measure of the
desire to comply), it was more likely for firms which
experienced incidents leading to accidental inspections to
have compliance schedules.
Interestingly, while
compliance schedules were also to be found more readily
the higher the amount of penalties actually paid, they
were less likely to be found the higher were the assessed
penalties. This suggests that regulators have succeeded
in negotiating compliance schedules as a quid pro quo for
leniency on penalty collection. Finally, compliance

Before continuing, we may draw two important
conclusions regarding penalties, inspections, and
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schedules were more likely to be found at firms with
lower average penalties and a higher foreign share of
ownership; this probably reflects the fact that minor
problems (as suggested by the smaller penalty) are
cheaper to fix, thereby facilitating the acceptance of a
compliance schedule and that foreign investors have more
money and are more interested in quickly improving their
environmental image.

quantity as enforcement resources are squeezed during
the transition period.
This plethora of stylized correlations, while intriguing, is
far from definitive, primarily due to the extensive
simultaneity and endogeneity of the various
characteristics examined. We therefore developed a
theoretical behavioral model13 of the enforcement game
between the enterprise and AR. This model was then
used to econometrically disentangle the relationship
between an enterprise’s level of compliance and AR’s
level of control and enforcement. Below we present the
findings of the model to examine the role of economic
instruments and command and control to influence the
enterprise’s investment response to the regulatory regime.

Looking across the eleven river basins in aggregate from
1993–96, a similar picture emerges regarding penalty and
collection rates and enforcement. First, average penalties
and collection rates over the period were negatively
correlated (-0.22). This suggests that because returns to
evasion are increasing in the value of penalties, higher
penalties tend to reduce collections; smaller penalties
therefore appear to be easier to collect.

NON-COMPLIANCE AND INVESTMENT

In general, greater abundance of water resources was
highly correlated to the number of penalties issued (0.68)
and to the value of penalties paid (0.49) but, curiously,
less so for the value of penalties assessed (0.28). The
number of inspections was unrelated to the value of
penalties assessed but correlated (0.27) to the value of
penalties paid. The average penalty assessed by basin
increased the fewer the number of users and amount of
water resources per inspector, suggesting that increasing
AR’s financial and human resources would improve
enforcement. While the number of users and the amount
of water resources had no effect on collection rates, the
latter did increase the fewer were the resources per user.
This complements the related finding on average
penalties and suggests that as water scarcity increases, the
user community does accept and take regulatory
enforcement more seriously.

Our estimated model suggests that the effect of expected
non-compliance leads to greater investment in water
quality. The amount of this investment was found to be
greater, the greater was past investment. The level of an
enterprise’s profitability indicates an ability to pay and
was found to have a positive effect on the firm’s level of
water investment. A negative relationship was found
between the firm’s level of water investment and its
amount of water discharges. This supports the hypothesis
discussed below that more polluting enterprises dilute
their waste streams, thereby lowering their average
concentrations and subsequent requirements in water
quality investment. Water consumption by the enterprise,
on the other hand, is costly and is found to trigger a
positive response in its water abatement investment.
We also examined the effects of the size of government
subsidies to the enterprise. The above results still hold;
the subsidies had no stimulative effect in generating
additional investment once the effects of other factors are
eliminated.

These river basin-level correlations aggregated over a
tumultuous four-year period, however, hide some
important temporal changes. First, while over the period
1993–95 the annual correlation between the collection
rate and average penalty size fluctuated between -0.37
and -0.50, it fell to zero in 1996. Second, the correlations
between the number of inspections, on the one hand, and
the scarcity of water resources and the number of
penalties, on the other, fall continuously and drastically
from a high of 0.67 and 0.69 in 1993, respectively, down
to a low of 0.18 and 0.17 in 1996. Furthermore, the
correlation between users per inspector and the average
penalty assessed fell from 0.67 to 0.36 over this period.
Worse, regression analysis yielded a negative growth rate
of inspection efficiency (number of penalties per
inspection) of -33 percent over this period. Since the
number of inspections increased 50 percent over this
period but staffing remained relatively constant, this is
clear evidence for inspection quality being sacrificed for

PRIVATIZATION
Romania, like most other countries in Eastern Europe, is
undergoing a massive privatization of its industrial
enterprises. This raises the question about whether the
ownership of an enterprise has been a missing factor in
the above analysis. As argued at the outset of this paper,
privatization should have at least two effects in theory.
First, the imposition of a “hard” budget constraint should
cause management to have a more pronounced response
to the price incentives of economic instruments. Second,
the new owners of privatized enterprises often have made
additional investment commitments and have brought
additional sources of capital (as well as the ability to
borrow it). While this may increase their ability to pay
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economic instruments on the one hand, it may also make
them targets for the regulatory agencies whose
compliance demands have historically been tailored to
their perceptions of an enterprise’s financial resources.
The profit motive brings with it pluses and minuses. On
the plus side, it causes enterprises to reduce all forms of
waste, including waste in the form of pollutants in water
discharges (which may even be potentially valuable if
recovered). On the minus side, however, it leads
enterprises to use relatively intensively those inputs
whose relative prices are lowest. Since weak enforcement
serves to reduce the perceived “price” of the
environment’s waste assimilation services, the profit
motive could encourage privatized enterprise to take
advantage of weak enforcement, thereby stretching (or
even ignoring) regulatory limits.

distort behavior. This is because the total payment is
based on the number of hours of factory operation times
a technical coefficient of discharge per hour of operation
times the monitored concentration. Thus, by exceeding
the technical discharge rate, the enterprise can reduce the
level of the monitored concentration. The only additional
cost for this sort of defensive action is to increase the
enterprise’s abstraction costs. Thus, if the discharge
tariff is sufficiently high relative to the abstraction
charge, behavior may become distorted.
This was confirmed by the model analysis. We find that
once (exogenous) water consumption is accounted for, an
enterprise’s abstraction is influenced by the degree of
pollutants it discharges, the more so the higher the (firmspecific) tariff rate. As predicted by the model, since
higher charges lead to greater abstraction as firms dilute
pollution discharges, the pollution charges have created
a perverse incentive to abstract water in excess of what is
needed to meet permit concentration requirements.

What is different about the privatized firm? Here we
looked at the firm characteristics after accounting for the
likely fact that the state’s share of ownership is probably
sector-specific. We found that enterprises with older
vintage equipment and lower capacity utilization tend to
have greater state ownership. These variables are
indicators of efficiency (as well as pollution generation).
However, surprisingly, greater numbers of employees or
lower profitability were not the mark of greater state
ownership in this sample.

COLLECTION RATES AND INSPECTIONS
Clearly, in order for economic instruments to have an
incentive effect, not only do they need to be raised to
economic levels, but the sums assessed must also be
collected. As presented in section 3, however, collection
rates are very poor. This calls into question the efficacy
of further raising pollution rates. In this section, we look
at a number of contributing factors at both the basin- and
the enterprise-level. These include ability-to-pay issues,
ownership, and the strength of regulatory enforcement.

We then examined the effect of accounting for the share
of state ownership on enterprise compliance and
environmental performance. We examined how the
compliance-enforcement relationship is affected by the
level state ownership. Controlling for other relevant
factors, we find that non-compliance is higher the greater
the level of state ownership. This finding is strengthened
when we look at how the performance of enterprises with
greater state ownership influences the assessed penalty
component of the pollution charge. Accounting for the
possibility of state pre-selection into more polluting
sectors, we find that higher levels of state ownership tend
to lead to higher average penalties, ceteris paribus.

At the basin level, we examine whether the average size
of the assessed pollution charge influences the collection
rate of the AR branch, once other factors are accounted
for. Two key factors include the state of the economy to
capture the general ability to pay of enterprises in the
basin, and the regulatory load of AR in the basin to
capture the strength of regulatory enforcement. We
would expect that basins with higher average charges
would lead to lower rates of repayment.
The results indicate that increases in the average charge
are associated with lower collection rates ceteris paribus.
Moreover, results show that collection rates would
improve if additional resources were allocated to
enforcement and if the state of the economy were to
improve.

PERVERSE RESPONSES: DILUTION EFFECTS
As is always the case with government intervention, even
of the economic instruments type, it can lead to perverse
incentives and unwanted side-effect behavior if
improperly designed. Consider the case of charging for
pollutants based on the discharge concentration. By
diluting the effluent stream, the polluter can reduce the
total tariff charges (or the threat of command and control
oversight). In Romania, though pollutant concentrations
are monitored together with the total volume of water
discharged, the actual computation procedure may still

Turning to the enterprise level and accounting for
regulatory load, we examined the effect of higher
pollution assessments on enterprise collection rates,
taking into account ownership structure and the second
profitability.14
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These more micro-level relationships reinforce the basinlevel insights above. First, the larger is the pollution
charge bill, the lower is the tendency to pay in full.
Second, the state of the economy effect on repayment in
the basin-level regression probably reflects the
enterprise’s lack of ability to pay, as proxied here by
profitability. Finally, we find that privatization will
improve enterprise payments of pollution charges —
regardless of profitabilty. While this is helpful in its own
right, it portends another more important development.
Since privatized enterprises will try to minimize input
costs, the fact that they tend to pay more of the charges
they are assessed indicates that they will be more
responsive to the existing (low) pollution charge rates;
thus, privatization should lead to reduced pollutant flows.

We ended our analysis by recognizing that it is the
expected pollution charge which economic agents use to
base their compliance decision, and that the expectation
was related to the rate of collection of the pollution
charges assessed. We therefore examined the collection
problem. We show that nonpayment of pollution charges
is inversely related to the level of the assessment and that
enterprise nonpayment is exacerbated, the more overstretched is the enforcement agency and the weaker is the
economy while it is ameliorated the more profitable are
enterprises. Finally, regardless of profitability, greater
state ownership increases nonpayment. As such, the
lower the enterprise’s ability to pay and the higher is its
assessed bill, the lower will be its rate of payment of
charges that do get assessed. These results, however,
point to solutions: enterprise privatization and greater
financial resources to the regulatory authorities.
Moreover, since privatized firms also seek to minimize
input costs, the fact that they are more likely to pay their
assessments corroborates our earlier result that they will
also improve their environmental compliance.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Based on the analysis above, a number of policy
conclusions may be drawn. First, although pollution fees
are extremely low and rarely assessed, they do have some
value in signaling to enterprises when the authorities are
fed up with the enterprise’s low compliance. As such and
probably only indirectly as a result, higher fee rates do
seem to generate an improvement in compliance. On the
other hand, as enterprise’s acceptance to pay these fees
falls, the higher is the overall fee bill. Still, it is possible
to discern an effect of these fees on enterprise investment
behavior, even after controlling for the level of water
authority enforcement efforts.15 Subsidies, on the other
hand, were found to have no influence on water sector
investment.
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ENDNOTES
1

This section draws on, updates, and extends Zinnes (1997).

2

This is not unusual internationally. Sachs et al. (1995) show that countries with a greater abundance of natural
resources have experienced lower long-run growth.

3

A summary of the worst of these impacts by key economic sector and by health, ecological and economic effect
is provided in Manea and Zinnes (1994).

4

Discharges into sewage systems are contracted directly with the municipality owning the sewage works. Such
services are not generally used by large enterprises.

5

The comparability of these two figures is in doubt since it is not clear whether the latter includes users without
valid permits while the former comprises only permit holders. Information from personal discussions with AR
officials.
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6

Information from personal discussions with AR officials.

7

Average consumption nationally for permitted industrial users was 25 m3/hr. The rationale to restrict the
sample to such firms was that, being the most polluting, they are the focus of regulatory enforcement such as it
is.

8

This dataset contains (1) general information related to location, ownership status, and type of activity, (2) size
and financial data, (3) capacity utilization and technology vintage, (4) detailed water consumption and
discharge data, (5) source and destination information on water abatement investment, including the loan
and/or subsidy terms, (6) a description of existing abatement investment and the regulatory compliance
situation, including measures of public pressure and (7) information regarding the enterprise’s foreign contacts.

9

We use the arbitrary cut-off of less than 0.20 as the absolute value of the correlation coefficient to describe two
variables as related or not.

10

Keep in mind that the “penalty” is really just the second component of the pollution charge representing the
price for above-permitted discharges.

11

The data itself generally indicate that if an enterprise paid any amount of the assessed penalty, it paid the full
amount; unfortunately, about half the fined enterprises chose to pay zero.

12

This is not as obvious as it may seem considering that most households in Romania do not have water 24 hours
a day. The paradox is resolved by noting that municipal systems have 60-percent loss rates and pumps are
turned off to reduce energy bills.

13

See Zinnes et al., (forthcoming, 1999) for complete description of the model and related econometric analysis.

14

Recall that for the current sample, profitability and state ownership share capture very different characteristics,
with no correlation between the two.

15

While not developed in this paper, the data have helped resolve a long-standing dispute regarding water
scarcity in Romania: no abstraction penalties were assessed, let alone collected. The reason? In spite of all the
hype, water is so abundant that abstraction permit levels may be set so high so that no enterprise need exceed
— never mind have to pay for — “excessive” (above-permitted) abstraction.
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